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Abstract 
Current theories of PTSD have proposed that enhanced perceptual processing and impaired 
conceptual processing contribute to PTSD symptoms. However, few studies have provided 
evidence for the role of conceptual processing during trauma. Dissociation may also be 
related. This study investigated whether artificially-induced dissociation impaired conceptual 
processing and increased the risk for PTSD symptoms. One hundred and sixty-six University 
students were exposed to a spinning dot (dissociation) condition, a moving picture condition 
or a sit quietly (control) condition at baseline, encoding and retrieval phases. They listened to 
a distressing narrative designed to simulate trauma (TFP-A) and recalled the narrative three 
days later. A word-cue association task was performed to measure conceptual priming. The 
induction failed to produce heightened dissociation in the spinning dot group, so spontaneous 
dissociation during encoding and retrieval was used as the independent variable. No 
differences were observed in conceptual priming across groups. In addition, no relationship 
was found between dissociation and analogue flashbacks, although dissociation was related 
to heightened distress of intrusions. The findings suggest that conceptual processing has a 









 The cognitive mechanisms underpinning Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are 
not fully understood. Several theories propose the existence of two systems associated with 
the development and maintenance of PTSD: a perceptual processing system responsible for 
interpreting sensory information and a conceptual processing system responsible for 
interpreting context and meaning of an event (Brewin, 2014). During a traumatic event, 
cognitive dysfunction is thought to occur, such that the experience is processed and retrieved 
largely as perceptual representations, while less cognitive processing is devoted to conceptual 
elaboration. A subsequent lack of context, meaning and understanding of the event is thought 
to contribute to PTSD symptoms. Abnormal levels of dissociation may facilitate this process.  
 This thesis aims to explore the relationship between the cognitive mechanisms which 
function during trauma and their effect on PTSD symptoms. It uses an analogue 
methodological design. An overview of PTSD symptomatology is initially given, followed by 
an overview of perceptual and conceptual processing and their involvement in posttraumatic 
symptom development. To further understand this relationship, empirical studies which have 
investigated the effect of these processing mechanisms on PTSD symptoms will be reviewed.     
This paper also investigates the role of dissociation in PTSD. While dissociation is 
thought to have an initial protective function during a traumatic event, it is also thought to be 
involved in the development and maintenance of PTSD symptoms. A current understanding 
suggests that dissociation may disrupt conceptual processing during a traumatic event (Olsen 
& Beck, 2012). However, few studies have successfully supported the relationship between 
impaired conceptual processing and increased levels of dissociation using an analogue 
design.        
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To address this inconsistency in the literature, this study used an audio version of the 
Trauma-Film Paradigm to help measure dissociation and conceptual processing in a 
laboratory environment. Outcome measures reflected participants’ ability to demonstrate 
conceptual processing, and the resulting effects on PTSD symptoms (cognitive intrusions and 
memory recall) following exposure to a dissociation-inducing stimulus.   
Overview of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Symptomatology 
PTSD is a collection of psychological symptoms resulting from exposure to a 
traumatic event, defined as involving perceived or actual death, serious injury or sexual 
violence (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Many people do not experience long 
lasting adverse psychological symptoms after experiencing trauma. However, in some cases, 
abnormal cognitive processing may occur during trauma. This may alter the perception of the 
experience, and may change previously held cognitive beliefs an individual has about 
themselves, others and the world around them. This change in processing may lead to the 
core features of PTSD: recurring mental recollections of the distressing event, feelings of 
hyper-arousal, difficulty regulating or experiencing emotion and avoidance of trauma-related 
stimuli (including places, thoughts and feelings associated with the event) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). An individual with PTSD will commonly report a sense of 
serious current threat when none is present (Brewin, Dalglish, & Joseph, 1996). According to 
DSM-5, symptoms must persist for at least one month following exposure to trauma to meet 
the clinical diagnosis of PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).   
PTSD may be characterised as a memory disorder (Brewin, 2014). One of the 
hallmark characteristics of PTSD is the recurrence of involuntary cognitive intrusions 
(usually in the form of mental images), including ‘flashbacks’, following exposure to a 
traumatic incident. Studies suggest that intrusive memories of distressing events are present 
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in normal, non-clinical populations, with an estimated frequency of 2-4 per day (Holmes & 
Bourne, 2008). These may be positive or negative in affect. However, persistent intrusive 
images of a traumatic event (characteristic of PTSD) can cause significant distress and/or 
impairment in occupational functioning in an individual (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). These 
intrusive memories are often triggered by cues that link elements in the present situation to 
similar elements experienced during the trauma. For example, an individual who was 
involved in a serious car crash several years earlier may have a flashback of the event due to 
observing a similar shade of red to the car they were in during the crash. Paradoxically, 
PTSD victims will often report an inability to intentionally recall specific information about 
the traumatic event (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). Information that is recalled is often 
disorganised and out of chronological order (Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002).  
Prevalence 
Although lifetime prevalence differs by trauma type and severity, PTSD affects 
between 2% to 9% of people globally (Atwoli, Stein, Koenen, & McLaughlin, 2015), and 
around 6% of people in New Zealand (Oakley Browne, Wells, & Scott, 2006). Higher rates 
of disorder likely reflect exposure to trauma that is interpersonal and intentional (for 
example, rape, conflict). The disorder occurs twice as often in women compared to men 
(Yehuda et al., 2015), and its age of onset is typically later in life. While figures suggest that 
up to 70% of individuals experience a traumatic event over the course of their lifetime, 
relatively few go on to develop PTSD (Yehuda et al., 2015). 
Etiology 
 PTSD is unique to the DSM-5 as it is one of only three mental disorders with a 
contingent etiological cause; that an individual must experience a stressful event or situation 
in order for PTSD to occur. Many pre-existing factors may increase vulnerability to 
developing PTSD, including a prior history of psychiatric disorder or trauma (Marks, 
 5 
Franklin, & Zoellner, 2018) and personality characteristics such as negative emotionality and 
neuroticism (Jakšic, Brajković, Ivezić, Topić, & Jakovljević, 2012).    
Research has suggested that factors which occur during trauma (such as dissociation) 
are the strongest predictors of future PTSD symptoms (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). 
In particular, the way memories are processed during trauma appears strongly linked to the 
future development of recurrent mental images or flashbacks of the event (Marks et al., 
2018). Studies have begun to identify the cognitive mechanisms involved in the processing 
and interpretation of stressful events that are involved in the genesis of PTSD.  
Memory Processing Involved in PTSD 
Autobiographical Memories  
PTSD has also been closely associated with long-term memory processing (Brewin, 
2014), specifically of autobiographical memories (episodic memories that recount events 
from an individual’s life). Autobiographical memories are elaborated memories which 
contain higher-level material of events, including their personal meaning and details, which 
are linked to specific points in time (chronology) (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
Research has implicated two distinct pathways for the processing of memories: a 
sensory and visuomotor-specific pathway for information such as sounds and images, and a 
conceptually-based memory pathway for a general understanding and interpretation of the 
meaning of events. 
Perceptual Processing 
Perceptual, or data-driven, processing involves the bottom-up interpretation of 
sensory specific information such as sounds and images. The processed features of a stimulus 
are limited to form and structure, and often occur implicitly (without conscious awareness). 
Retrieval of a stimulus via the perceptual pathway involves identification with surface-level 
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features that do not require extensive understanding or context (Brewin, 2014). In perceptual 
processing, sensory information is typically visual and normally decays rapidly. In general, 
little cognitive attention is given to encode this form of information.   
A model proposed by Brewin et al. (1996) has suggested that perceptual memory 
representations form a Situationally Accessible Memory (SAM) storage unit, and can only be 
accessed automatically through cues associated with the traumatic event. Evidence of 
perceptual processing is often reflected by tasks involving implicit retrieval, usually through 
a priming paradigm (Weldon, Roediger, Beitel, & Johnston, 1995) such as a word-stem 
completion task (Golier, Yehuda, Lupien, & Harvey, 2003). This task presents the start of a 
previously seen word to participants, and they are asked to complete the word. Perceptual 
processing is evident if they choose the previously seen word. For example, Lyttle, Dorahy, 
Hanna, and Huntjens (2010) assessed clinical participants who experienced traumatic events 
related to the Troubles (i.e. civil conflict) in Northern Ireland. Priming was indicated by 
successfully retrieving words related to the Troubles, such as paramilitary. Studies have 
found an association between dissociation and increased perceptual priming (Lyttle et al., 
2010; Michael & Ehlers, 2007).   
Conceptual Processing 
Conceptual processing involves the top-down interpretation of events characterised by 
deeper understanding, context and, most importantly, meaning to an individual. Higher-order 
processing is needed to develop sufficient elaboration and interpretation of an event, in order 
to place it within the context of what it means to the individual and its correct chronology 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). It also assists with the integration of the memory with 
other long-term similar memories. This form of processing uses more controlled and 
conscious processes, and it may be demonstrated by tasks such as word-cue association 
(Lyttle et al., 2010). This task presents a word to participants that has similar semantic 
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meaning to a previously seen word, and participants are asked for an alternative or associated 
word, with conceptual priming evident if they chose the previously seen word.   
Most memory involves the processing and storage of the contextual information of 
events. Contextually-processed information is necessary for successful integration in the 
autobiographical memory store. For example, an individual in a conversation is likely to 
remember the topic of the conversation, and less likely to remember the colour of the lipstick 
or glasses the other person was wearing (characterised by perceptual processing). Brewin et 
al. (1996) referred to conceptually processed events as part of the Verbally Accessible 
Memory (VAM), available upon voluntary recall.   
Cognitive Dysfunction Theory of PTSD 
One of the key cognitive theories of PTSD is that intrusive memories are caused by 
dysfunctional memory processing during extreme stress experienced in a traumatic event 
(Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004). This involves a shift in attentive cognitive resources 
from conceptual information to perceptual information. As a result, there is an increase in 
largely unconscious perceptual information encoding and a decrease in largely conscious 
conceptual encoding. With a lack of elaboration of the trauma, the memory is more likely to 
be represented by perceptual information, and contextual information of the trauma is less 
likely to be recalled on command after the event. This process is proposed to lead to intrusive 
thoughts (flashbacks) and may explain why unintentional intrusive memories may be 
triggered by specific cues associated with a trauma after it has occurred, and why intentional 
or detailed recall of the trauma may be difficult (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Kindt, Van den Hout, 
Arntz, & Drost, 2008).  
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Processing of Trauma in PTSD Populations 
Currently, the reasons why some people develop PTSD following trauma and others 
do not are not fully understood. Tuval-Mashiach, Freedman, and Shalev (2004) suggested 
that the period immediately following a trauma is crucial in determining whether an 
individual will develop PTSD symptoms. Representations of the event that remain restricted 
to perceptual processing strongly increase the likelihood of developing PTSD symptoms, 
particularly flashbacks.  
While an increased level of perceptual processing may be expected to occur during 
trauma, continued reliance on remembering the event via the perceptual pathway hinders the 
ability to properly process the event via the conceptual pathway (Kindt et al., 2008; Buck, 
Kindt, Van den Hout, Steen, & Linders, 2006). The trauma is most likely to be remembered 
through ‘triggers’ from cues that may be perceptually similar to those experienced during the 
traumatic event (Kleim, Ehring, & Ehlers, 2012). For example, a shade of blue may remind 
an individual of the colour of the jacket their attacker wore. These perceptual cues can cause 
an individual to re-experience the event in a very vivid and distressing manner (Hellawell & 
Brewin, 2004), and the trauma is often re-experienced as though it was happening in the 
present moment. Reliance on the perceptual representation of trauma, in conjunction with a 
failure to successfully elaborate, develop meaning, and place the event in the 
autobiographical memory store, is seen in PTSD populations (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
A Dutch research group investigated cognitive mechanisms of change during and 
after treatment for PTSD, and the effect of these cognitive mechanisms of change on PTSD 
symptoms (Kindt, Buck, Arntz, & Soeter, 2007). Twenty-five trauma victims were treated 
using a CBT technique which used Imaginal Exposure and Imagery Rescripting tools to 
correct dysfunctional interpretations of the event. This process introduced new experiences 
and emotions related to the trauma. Trauma narratives from the patients were gathered before 
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treatment, after treatment and at one-month follow up to infer levels of perceptual and 
conceptual processing. These trauma narratives were audio recorded, transcribed and then 
coded into utterances. These utterances were rated on their type of representation (lower 
ratings reflected conceptual utterances, higher ratings reflected perceptual utterances). The 
authors discovered that a change from perceptual processing after treatment to conceptual 
processing one-month later was related to a decrease in PTSD symptoms. Interestingly, the 
authors also discovered that a relative increase in perceptual processing during treatment was 
associated with a relative increase in conceptual processing after treatment. Their overall 
conclusion suggested that Imagined Exposure in CBT for PTSD may promote later 
conceptual processing. This finding was consistent with theories of cognitive changes in 
PTSD which suggest that trauma memories must first be accessible in the SAM (through the 
perceptual pathway) to be integrated into the VAM (through the conceptual pathway).    
Emotional imprints left by trauma appear to be qualitatively different to normal 
events in how they are remembered (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). When asked to describe 
their trauma, individuals with chronic PTSD often focus on specific details that comprise 
sensory information, in contrast to normal populations (i.e. have more perceptual processing). 
For example, an individual who experienced a car accident may highlight the sound of a car 
horn before impact, or the exact moment the windscreen shattered and they saw glass sprayed 
everywhere. Evidence for these sensory representations can be found in studies which have 
investigated recollections of trauma. Tuval-Mashiach et al. (2004) asked five Jewish 
survivors of an ambush (they were shot at) to describe their experiences immediately after the 
attack, one week later and four months later. They discovered that descriptions of the event 
by survivors directly after the incident were fragmented, broken and lacked chronology 
(suggesting prominent perceptual processing). After four months, most of the survivors gave 
a more detailed and context-rich account of the attack and had high levels of positive self-
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image (suggesting more conceptual processing). At that time, they were able to attribute their 
survival to ‘miracles’ (Hassidic Jews attribute events to miracles) which demonstrated a 
strong integration of the event with cultural meaning. However, the one individual who went 
on to develop PTSD had a trauma narrative emphasising perceptual details (“We heard 
explosions, then we heard the window smashed”). Months later they had failed to develop a 
positive representation of themselves, the event and its meaning (elaboration via the 
conceptual pathway).  
Peritraumatic studies generally rely on retrospective accounts of trauma which are 
often inaccurate (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). As trauma is often acute and its cognitive effects 
immediate, retrospective self-report measures may be an unreliable source of assessing 
cognitive processing styles. In addition, early studies of peritraumatic processing used 
correlational research designs, which failed to control for pre-existing or confounding factors 
such as traumatic brain injury (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Prospective designs were therefore 
needed. However, exposing individuals to real-life trauma is beyond the ethical scope of 
research. Analogue measures of trauma, such as the Trauma Film Paradigm (TFP), have been 
used as a means to study mechanisms of peritraumatic processing and PTSD symptom 
development.     
The Trauma Film Paradigm (TFP) 
Since its use as a measure of physiological stress response during the 1960s, the TFP 
has been developed as a valid and reliable measure of simulated trauma (Holmes & Bourne, 
2008). In the TFP, participants are exposed to a short film depicting distressing content (e.g., 
car accidents or WWII film clip images) to simulate a trauma-like situation. By controlling 
the trauma environment, peritraumatic and posttraumatic changes (such as 
perceptual/conceptual processing or dissociation) can be observed and manipulated, and their 
effects on PTSD symptoms studied (e.g., frequency and severity of flashbacks). Several 
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studies have successfully used an audio version of the TFP (TFP-A) to simulate a trauma-like 
situation (Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2010; Dorahy, Peck, & Huntjens, 2016). The 
inclusion of traumatic factors which can be manipulated in a laboratory setting may improve 
the accuracy of peritraumatic studies, but lack external validity. 
Experimental Studies  
Experimental studies have attempted to investigate real-world peritraumatic memory 
processing through exposure to low-level trauma while manipulating memory processing. 
Kindt et al. (2008) investigated cognitive processing mechanisms after showing a distressing 
film (TFP), and the influence of this processing on subsequent flashbacks. For their first 
experiment, participants were shown a distressing film. They were then instructed to write an 
essay which focussed only on the physical details of the film, such as colours or facial 
expressions (perceptual processing group) or an essay which focussed only on the meaning of 
the film (conceptual processing group). The essays were scored and rated by the authors 
based on the content of the narratives (largely perceptual or largely conceptual). Flashbacks 
and avoidance of intrusive thoughts or images after the film were also recorded, as was state 
dissociation before and after the film. The authors found that the perceptual processing group 
experienced significantly more intrusions than the conceptual processing group. This result 
was in line with their predictions; that perceptual processing after trauma increases the risk of 
developing flashbacks. 
In their second study, Halligan et al. (2002) assigned non-clinical participants to 
either a perceptual processing group or a conceptual processing group during presentation of 
a distressing film depicting real-life road traffic accidents. The conceptual group was 
instructed to focus on the meaning and context of the film. The perceptual group was 
instructed to focus on the images and sounds in the film. PTSD and dissociative symptoms 
were then measured one week later. Their results showed that the perceptual processing 
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group experienced more intrusions compared to the conceptual group. However, these groups 
were pre-selected before the experiment. For example, the perceptual processing group was 
selected due to their naturally high levels of trait dissociation and anxiety, biasing the study 
results.  
These and other experimental studies have generally shown that by manipulating an 
increase in the perceptual processing of a traumatic event, the risk of developing PTSD 
symptoms increases. However, the findings from conceptual processing studies have been 
mixed. A second experiment by Kindt et al. (2008) investigated peritraumatic memory 
processing during encoding of a distressing film and subsequent PTSD symptoms. The 
results from their study were that conceptual processing, relative to perceptual processing and 
neutral groups, reduced the suppression of intrusions. These participants experienced fewer 
avoidance symptoms. However, conceptual processing during the encoding of the trauma did 
not significantly reduce the frequency of intrusions compared to the perceptual processing 
group. A replication study one year later showed near identical findings (Buck, Kindt, & Van 
den Hout, 2009).  
Another study investigated whether post-trauma elaboration (guided reflection to aid 
the re-working of memories of the traumatic stimulus) reduced PTSD symptoms. Michael 
and Ehlers (2007) assigned non-clinical participants to either an experimental condition 
designed to facilitate elaboration, or a control condition. Increased perceptual processing was 
first established in both groups by picture stories which depicted distressing content (these 
were also counterbalanced with neutral pictures). Perceptual processing was measured by a 
perceptual priming task. Both groups were then shown a distressing film. The results showed 
that the elaboration group experienced fewer intrusive images of the trauma material 
compared to the control group.  
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Currently, there is insufficient evidence to support the role of conceptual processing 
in PTSD symptomatology.   
Interaction of Perceptual and Conceptual Processing in PTSD  
It is currently unclear whether the processes involved in the encoding of memory (i.e. 
perceptual vs. conceptual) are connected (for example, low perceptual, high conceptual, or 
vice versa) or whether they exist as separate systems. Some conceptualisations suggest an 
inverse relationship; as one form of processing increases, the other decreases (Buck et al., 
2006). However, other theories suggest that perceptual processing may be independent from 
conceptual processing, as outlined in the dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin et al., 
1996). This theory suggests that PTSD symptoms are caused by either unimpeded encoding 
of information into the SAM, or information encoded by the VAM is reduced or interrupted. 
According to the dual representation theory, PTSD may result from the inability to tolerate 
re-experiencing the event, therefore the trauma is never re-encoded into episodic memory.  
Overall, there is insufficient evidence to support one theory over another. However, 
all accounts agree that under stressful conditions (such as experienced by trauma), perceptual 
processing tends to function more effectively than conceptual processing (Brewin, 2014). 
This higher perceptual processing, and reduced conceptual processing may be the result of 
dissociation during trauma.  
Dissociation in PTSD 
Defining Dissociation 
In its broadest sense, dissociation is a disconnect between two or more mental 
processes that would otherwise be connected (Cardeña, 1994). According to the American 
Psychiatric Association (2013), dissociation is defined as the disruption in the usually 
integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment. 
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Given these multiple domains, the term dissociation is difficult to precisely define (there is no 
consensus on its definition among studies investigating dissociation and its effects). 
However, in the context of PTSD, dissociation may indicate altered perceptions of the self 
(for example, detachment from emotion, personality or memory) or the environment (for 
example, altered perceptions of time, seeing events as though in a dream) because of trauma. 
For this review, dissociation is a cognitive process that interferes with the successful 
integration of material that would normally be filtered through conscious awareness (Olsen & 
Beck, 2012).   
 Dissociation was initially viewed as a categorical variable, present only in individuals 
with mental disorders (particularly hysteria). However, another way to understand 
dissociation is to conceive it as existing on a continuum (Spitzer, Barnow, Freyberger, & 
Grabe, 2006). As figure 1 shows, non-pathological forms of dissociation occur frequently.  
 
 
Figure 1. A continuum model of dissociation. Adapted from 
https://autumnasphodel.com/328/meet-my-alters-part-2.  
  
Mild forms of dissociation such as daydreaming or driving on autopilot (sometimes 
referred to as ‘highway hypnosis’) are common in the general population. These are caused 
by common cognitive failures rather than underlying neurological or psychological deficits. 














‘dissociative disorders’ described in DSM 5, and symptoms found in PTSD. Examples of 
these include experiencing the self as fragmented (depersonalisation), altered perceptions of 
reality (derealisation) and lapses in memory of an event or time (dissociative amnesia).    
Peritraumatic Dissociation  
 Peritraumatic dissociation is characterised by dissociative experiences that occur 
during or immediately after trauma (Van der Hart, Van Ochten, Van Son, Steele, & Lensvelt-
Mulders, 2008). Examples of peritraumatic dissociation include altered perceptions of the 
trauma event (time slowing down), the trauma environment (a lack of environmental 
awareness, viewing the event through a fog, perceiving the event as unreal) and the self (out-
of-body experience, reduction in pain, emotional numbing) (Zoellner & Bittenger, 2004). 
Peritraumatic experiences are common during trauma (Huntjens, Dorahy, & Van Wees-
Cieraad, 2013).   
Trait Dissociation 
 Trait dissociation refers to persistent dissociation or a general tendency to experience 
dissociative symptoms (Hagenaars & Krans, 2011) and is relatively stable over time.  
The Relationship Between Dissociation and PTSD 
Dissociation and PTSD  
Both peritraumatic and persistent dissociation have been closely associated with 
PTSD symptom development (McCaslin et al., 2008; Lyttle et al., 2010; Briere, Scott, & 
Weathers, 2005). Murray, Ehlers, and Mayou (2002) interviewed 27 inpatient and 176 
outpatient victims of road traffic accidents on measures of dissociation (peritraumatic 
dissociation and persistent dissociation four weeks after the accident), pre-accident 
dissociative tendencies, memory fragmentation, data-driven processing and rumination. The 
power of these variables to predict PTSD symptoms at four weeks and six months after the 
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accident was assessed. They found that persistent dissociation was the strongest predictor of 
chronic PTSD symptoms (6 months after the accident) for both inpatients and outpatients. 
A robust meta-analysis by Ozer et al. (2003) investigated seven predictors of PTSD 
symptoms. This included 16 studies (from 68 studies overall) that looked at the relationship 
between peritraumatic dissociation and future PTSD symptoms in 3,534 individuals. 
Peritraumatic dissociation was the best predictor of PTSD symptoms, over and above 
biological and social factors (although this study did not investigate persistent dissociation).  
Whilst there have been some conflicting results, perhaps due to methodological issues 
within the literature (e.g., misunderstood interpretations of peritraumatic and persistent 
dissociation, Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner (2012)), most studies agree that dissociation of 
some form plays an important role in the development and maintenance of PTSD symptoms 
(Werner & Griffin, 2012).    
Dissociation and Cognitive Processing of Trauma Memories  
 One of the key mechanisms underlying dissociation and subsequent PTSD 
development appears to be a failure to correctly encode, retrieve or integrate trauma elements 
with previous experiences. During trauma, dissociation may prevent normal elements of 
context, time and elaboration of the event from successfully integrating with the 
autobiographical memory store. This dissociation may impact on perceptual and conceptual 
processing.    
Huntjens et al. (2013) suggested a combined model of peritraumatic dissociation 
(initial disruption) and persistent dissociation (maintenance of PTSD symptoms) to explain 
PTSD development and maintenance. Peritraumatic dissociation may initially provide a shift 
in attentive resources during trauma (from the processing of largely conceptual information, 
to the processing of largely perceptual information). This, along with decreased focal 
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attention during trauma, is thought to disrupt normal conceptual processing, and promote 
encoding the event via the perceptual pathway (Lyttle et al., 2010). The event is, therefore, 
largely perceptually-encoded. Persistent dissociation may promote the maintenance of PTSD 
symptoms by impeding elaboration, meaning and integration of the memory into the 
autobiographical store (Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003). The event is unable to be 
conceptually processed and this may lead to continued flashbacks of the trauma as well as 
difficulty voluntarily retrieving it. Overall, dissociation is thought to disrupt memory 
processes involved with the encoding and retrieval of trauma-related information (Olsen & 
Beck, 2012). 
Experimentally Controlled Dissociation  
Attempts to manipulate dissociation in analogue studies have yielded inconclusive 
results. In a series of studies, Holmes et al. (2004) attempted to artificially induce dissociation 
to investigate the relationship between memory processing and intrusive memory 
development. In their first experiment, non-clinical participants were assigned to one of three 
experimental conditions while watching a trauma film: a visuospatial tapping condition, a 
dissociation condition (participants watched a small dot designed to induce dissociation on a 
screen), or a no-task condition. The visuospatial tapping task involved repetitious tapping of a 
complex five-key pattern on a keypad during the film, and was theorised to use similar 
cognitive resources as SAM (perceptual memory) encoding. As there was competition for 
these resources, the concurrent tapping task was predicted to interfere with SAM encoding 
(heightening conceptual or VAM encoding) and reduce subsequent intrusions. This model 
was based on the dual-representation theory of memory (Brewin et al., 1996). The primary 
outcome was the frequency of intrusive memories of the film over one week, as recorded in a 
diary given to participants. As predicted, the results indicated that the visuospatial tapping 
group experienced fewer intrusions compared to the other groups. However, contrary to the 
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author’s predictions, the dissociation group did not experience more intrusions compared to 
the other groups, despite experiencing the highest change in state dissociation. The results did 
indicate that a spontaneous increase in state dissociation was positively correlated with an 
increase in intrusions across all conditions, which was replicated in a second and third study 
by Holmes et al. (2004). The authors concluded that the small dot may have been insufficient 
to induce dissociation.  
According to a review article of the TFP by Holmes and Bourne (2008), no study at 
the time of writing had successfully manipulated dissociation in an experimental study of 
PTSD symptom development. A recently updated review article by Marks et al. (2018) 
reported the same finding. Although one study by Buck et al. (2006) did find a significant 
relationship between experimentally-induced state dissociation and cognitive intrusions in 
individuals with spider phobia, their study did not use a TFP.  
Overall, the inconclusive findings of these studies may have been due to 
methodological differences between them. For example, Holmes and Bourne (2008) 
suggested that attempted manipulations of memory processing (data-driven/perceptual versus 
conceptual) through verbal instructions may be less valid than manipulations resulting from 
participant tasks (e.g., assignment to specific conditions with different stimuli). Other 
methodological shortcomings include the delayed assessment of peritraumatic dissociation, 
the types of dissociation measures used, and the use of clinical versus non-clinical 
populations (Dorahy et al., 2016). More research in this area with improved methodology 
appears required.    
Conceptual Priming in PTSD Studies 
 Studies investigating the link between dissociation and conceptual priming report 
mixed results. Olsen and Beck (2012) found that individuals with high trait dissociation 
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scores showed difficulties with encoding and retrieving distressing information (indicating 
lower conceptual processing) compared to those with low trait dissociation scores. Lyttle et 
al. (2010) found a decrease in conceptual priming for trauma-related words in a sample with 
PTSD compared to participants without PTSD. However, no significant correlation between 
dissociation and conceptual priming was reported. An analogue study conducted by Dorahy 
et al. (2016) also found no evidence for a link between dissociation and conceptual priming. 
Currently, few studies have been successful in linking dissociation with a decrease in 
conceptual priming. 
The Present Study 
This study aimed to investigate the link between peritraumatic dissociation, memory 
processing and PTSD symptoms. More specifically, this study aimed to assess whether 
dissociation could be successfully induced in a laboratory setting. Research has supported the 
role of peritraumatic dissociation in the development of PTSD symptoms and how these 
processes are closely connected. However, no studies have successfully manipulated outcome 
variables by inducing dissociation using an analogue design. This study used a two-session 
design over a period of three days. Between session one and session two (where the TFP-A 
was given and recalled), an intrusion diary was given to participants as a measure of 
cognitive intrusions, similar to previous research designs (Hagenaars & Krans, 2011; Dorahy 
et al., 2016; Holmes et al., 2004). As recurring mental flashbacks are a core feature of a 
PTSD diagnosis, these intrusions were measured as a rating of PTSD symptomatology. It was 
predicted that those who experienced dissociation at encoding would have more intrusions 
over the course of three days compared to other conditions. 
Secondly, this study aimed to further investigate the link between conceptual processing 
and dissociation. Many theories of dissociation have predicted that impaired conceptual 
processing increases the risk for PTSD symptoms (Kindt et al., 2008). However, few studies 
 20 
have successfully demonstrated this relationship using an analogue study design. To test this 
theory, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions for their first session: 
a dissociation condition (observing a spinning dot), a neutral condition (observing neutral 
pictures) or a control condition. Participants were exposed to one of these three conditions 
while listening to simulated traumatic material (i.e. auditory TFP). Participants returned two 
days later and were instructed to recall the trauma information in as much detail as they could 
remember. During this task, participants were again assigned to the dissociation condition, 
the neutral picture condition or the control condition. Those who were placed in the 
dissociation condition at both encoding and retrieval phases were predicted to have impaired 
conceptual processing for the traumatic event (TFP-A). Therefore, individuals placed in this 
group were predicted to have a recall of the trauma which was less conceptually-based than 
the other conditions.  
In addition, a conceptual priming task was incorporated as another measure of conceptual 
processing. A word-cue association task was used (similar to the task used by Lyttle et al., 
(2010)) to test for semantically-processed words during the encoding phase of the 
experiment. Three separate groupings of words were presented; Target-Threat words 
(threatening words included in the TFP-A, e.g., Torture), Target-Neutral words (non-
threatening words included in the TFP-A, e.g., Desert) and Non-Target Threat words 
(threatening words not included in the TFP-A, e.g., Killing). Conceptual processing was 
demonstrated by successfully retrieving previously-encoded words. In line with the 
hypothesis of a study by Lyttle et al. (2010), participants who experienced dissociation at 
encoding were predicted to show impaired conceptual processing for target-threat words 




Research Design  
The overall design was a 3 (memory process: baseline, encoding, retrieval) x 3 
(condition: picture, spiral, sit quietly) mixed design. The memory process independent 
variable was repeated measures and the condition independent variable was between subjects. 
The dependent variables included dissociation (state and trait), level of conceptual priming, 
invasive memories (frequency and severity), depression, anxiety and the retrieval 
characteristics of information (e.g., conceptual representation).   
Participants 
Participants were University students from the Christchurch region of New Zealand. 
There were 179 participants (61 males, 117 females, 1 identified as other) aged from 17 to 54 
(M = 22.13, SD = 6.13). Thirteen participants were excluded due to being below age 18 (N = 
1), not being enrolled as a University student (N = 2), failing validity questions (N = 4), not 
returning for the second session (N = 5) or experiencing a computer glitch during the study 
(N = 1). The final sample for analysis comprised 166 participants (57 males, 108 females, 1 
identified as other) with a mean age of 22.05 (SD = 5.80). Those excluded did not differ from 
those included on gender, 2 (2, N = 179) = .16, p = .93, age, F(1, 177) = .39, p = .54, p2 = 
.00, trauma type (interpersonal or non-interpersonal), 2 (1, N = 61) = .04, p = .85, time since 
trauma, 2 (3, N = 62) = 4.08, p = .25, or whether participants still thought about their trauma, 
2 (1, N = 62) = .07, p = .79. However, those excluded from the analysis experienced more 
trauma than those included, 2 (1, N = 179) = 4.48, p = .03. Ethnicity and education were not 
subjected to analyses due to low cell counts in some cells.   
One hundred and six participants were recruited via a student participant pool and 
were given 3 course credits for completing the study. The remaining sixty participants were 
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volunteer University students recruited through posters (see Appendix J) and emails around 
University. They were given a $5 coffee voucher upon completion of the first session, and a 
$10 shopping voucher upon completion of the second session of the study. Inclusion criteria 
were over the age of 18, having an acceptable grasp of both written and spoken English, 
having normal or adjusted to normal vision and hearing, and providing written informed 
consent prior to commencing the study (see Appendix D).  
Participant Assignment  
 Participants were randomly assigned (sequentially) to one of five experimental 
conditions at the start of their first sessions. Their condition determined what visual stimuli 
they received at baseline, encoding and retrieval. At baseline they saw either (1) a spinning 
dot (dissociation task), (2) a set of moving pictures (picture task) or (3) no visual stimuli. 
Those who received the dissociation task at baseline received the picture task during the 
encoding phase of the study. Those who received the picture task at baseline received the 
dissociation task at encoding. This design minimised practice (or familiarity) effects from 
baseline to the next (encoding) phase of the study. Thus, the groups were: (1) Dissociation at 
Encoding/Dissociation at Retrieval (DEDR), (2) Dissociation at Encoding/Picture (non-
dissociation) at Retrieval (DEPR), (3) Picture at Encoding/Dissociation at Retrieval (PEDR), 
(4) Picture at Encoding/Picture at Retrieval (PEPR) and (5) Listening (without visual stimuli) 
at Encoding/Listening at Retrieval (LELR). The listening condition also received the 
listening task at baseline (i.e., a true control condition with listening only at all three 




Trauma-Film Paradigm Audio Recording (TFP-A) 
Participants listened to a potentially distressing narrative of a journalist being 
kidnapped, tortured, and eventually executed by terrorists. The narrative was based on the 
true events of a reporter, which was published in The New York Times in the article The 
Horror Before the Beheadings (Callimachi, 2014). The story was pieced together from events 
reported by other hostages who were ultimately freed. The narrative for this study was 
shortened to a recorded piece that lasted just over 8 minutes in length, which drew from the 
published case the events which occurred in a chronically-organised manner. The storyline 
depicted the reporter’s initial kidnapping, subsequent torture experiences and execution. 
Participants listened to the narrative through headphones. 
Condition Independent Variable 
Spinning-Dot Task (Experimental Condition/Dissociation Task) 
This study used a modified version of the spinning dot task which had been 
successfully shown to induce dissociation (e.g., Dorahy et al., 2016). A dot was presented in 
the middle of a series of rotating circles on a computer screen, which gave the illusion the 
circles were ‘spinning’ around the dot. Throughout this task, red crosses appeared randomly 
in the middle of the screen. When a red cross appeared, participants were instructed to press a 
button on a Chronos box (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, 2019) to ensure 





Figure 2. An approximate visual representation of the spinning-dot visual stimuli. Note: Left 
shows spinning dot without cross, right with cross.  
Pictures Task (Control Condition/Picture Task)  
Pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) with 
valence ratings of pleasure between 4.00 and 6.99 to ensure neutral affect. Pictures appeared 
in random order and in random locations on screen for three seconds before changing. During 
the task, a red cross appeared in the middle of the screen. When a red cross appeared, 
participants were instructed to press a button on a Chronos box to ensure engagement in the 
exercise. This pictures task was designed to keep attention shifting to active stimuli to reduce 
the likelihood of dissociative experiences like trance states, daydreams, depersonalisation and 
derealisation. 
No Stimuli (Control Condition/No Visual Stimuli Task) 
In the control condition participants were not presented with any visual stimuli. 
Instead, they listened to the TFP-A in front of a blank computer screen.   
Instructions 
Each participant was presented with a list of instructions detailing their task during 
baseline, encoding and retrieval. Prior to the baseline task, participants were instructed to 
watch the visual stimuli on the screen (spiral and picture conditions) and press the button 
indicated to them on the Chronos box when a red cross appeared. The control condition was 
instructed to sit quietly. During the encoding phase, all participants were told their memory 
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would be tested, and to concentrate on the story while performing their indicated task (staring 
at the spinning dot, staring at pictures or listening quietly). During the retrieval phase, all 
participants were asked to recall their memory of the story in as much detail as they could 
remember while performing their indicated task (staring at the spinning dot, staring at 
pictures or recalling as normal). These instructions are detailed in Appendix E.  
Intrusion Diary 
Participants were issued with an intrusion diary (see Appendix H), with detailed 
instructions on how to complete it, at the end of the first session. They were instructed to 
recall any spontaneous thoughts of the trauma narrative in this diary. The diary was split into 
three days with each day sectioned into morning, afternoon, evening and night. Each time-
period had a column for a full detailed description of the intrusion, including its type (audio, 
visual, audio/visual), the emotion it activated and distress it caused (rated on a ten-point 
Likert scale). On an eleven-point Likert scale from 0 (never remembered to write down the 
thoughts/memories/feelings) to 10 (always remembered to write down the 
thoughts/memories/feelings), participants rated their compliance with diligently recording of 
their intrusive memories. 
Questionnaires 
 The Demographic Questionnaire collected data on gender, age, ethnicity, highest 
level of educational achievement, and whether the participant had been involved in a 
traumatic incident. If participants endorsed prior trauma (yes/no), they were also asked to 
briefly describe the event, and how long ago the event occurred. They were also asked how 
often they thought about the trauma on a six-point Likert scale; Never (0) to Multiple Times a 
Day (6), and on an eleven-point Likert scale how much distress it caused them when they 
thought about it; Totally Relaxed/No Emotion (0) to Highest Emotion They Had Ever Felt 
(10). All participants were asked whether they had ever been diagnosed with a mental 
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disorder (yes/no). If so, they were asked to give details of the disorder. All participants were 
also asked whether they had been told they had difficulty remembering things, whether they 
had trouble with their hearing or vision and whether these had been corrected (yes/no). On a 
yes/no dichotomous scale, they were also asked whether they had ever lost consciousness 
from a head injury (if so, for how long).   
 The Dissociative Experiences Scale –II (DES-II; Carlson & Putnam, 1993) used a 28 
self-report item index to assess trait dissociative experiences. It contained a subset of 8-items 
designed to detect pathological dissociation (DES-Taxon; Carlson & Putnam, 1993). 
Answers ranged from Never (0% of the time) to Always (100% of the time). The DES has 
shown good reliability and validity as a measure of trait dissociation (Van IJendoorn & 
Schuengel, 1996). Internal reliability for the current study was strong (a = .92). 
The Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a 21-
item measure of feelings of depression, anxiety and stress over the previous week. Each 
question is assessed using a four-point Likert scale ranging from Did Not Apply to Me (0) to 
Applied to Me Very Much, or Most of the Time (3). The DASS has shown good internal 
reliability (a = .88) (Tran, Tran, & Fisher, 2013). Internal reliability for the current study was 
strong (a = .86). 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-6 (STAI-6; Marteau & Bekker, 1992) is a 6-item 
index of state anxiety based on the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). Each 
question was assessed using a four-point Likert scale to assess how the participant was 
feeling at that specific moment. Questions with positive wording were reverse-coded to 
reflect higher anxiety in higher scores. Answers ranged from Not at All (1) to Very Much (4). 
The STAI-6 was administered at baseline and at encoding with good internal reliability for 
the current study (a = .77 at baseline, a = .86 at encoding).  
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 The Modified Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire (MPDEQ; 
Marshall, Orlando, Jaycox, Foy, & Belzberg, 2002) is a 9-item index designed to measure 
peritraumatic dissociation at baseline, encoding, and retrieval stages of the experiment. The 
MPDEQ is an adaptation of the Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire 
(PDEQ; Marmar, Weiss, & Metzler, 1997), with an extra question added to assess emotional 
numbing. Each question is assessed on a five-point Likert scale ranging from Not at All True 
(1) to Very Much True (5). The MPDEQ has shown good internal reliability and validity 
(Marshall et al., 2002). Reliability for the current study was relatively strong at baseline (a = 
.78), at encoding (a = .77) and was strong at retrieval (a = .80). 
 Validity Questions were included six times in the first session of the experiment and 
ten times during session two. The questions were designed to ensure correct focus, 
engagement and understanding of the tasks. The validity questions for Session One read; If 
you are reading this please select 100% (eleventh across) (placed in the DES scale); If you 
are reading this question select Number 3 (placed in the DASS scale); What stimuli were you 
just shown on the computer screen? How much were you able to fully focus or attend to the 
spinning dot and red crosses/pictures and red crosses/narrative? How anxious were you 
whilst listening to the narrative? And finally, How well do you remember the story? The 
validity questions for Session Two read; How clear and organised do you feel your memory 
is of what you heard three days ago? How well do you remember the story? Since I listened 
to the story, I have thought about its content (i.e., rehearsed recalling the narrative); Since I 
listened to the story, I have talked about its content to others; If you are reading this, please 
select ‘Very Much True’ (placed in the MPDEQ recall); What stimuli were you just shown on 
the computer screen? How much were you able to fully focus or attend to the spinning dot 
and red crosses/pictures and red crosses/ recalling the narrative? How anxious were you 
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whilst recalling the narrative? How much did you understand the narrative? And finally, 
How disorganised and/or jumbled do you believe your recollection was?   
Conceptual Priming Task 
A word-cue association task was used to assess conceptual priming for previously 
encoded words. A cue word was shown on the computer screen and participants were 
instructed to answer with the first associated word that came to mind by speaking into a 
recording microphone. After an answer was submitted, a cross appeared in the middle of the 
screen for 2 seconds, followed by the next word-cue. For example, participants could be 
presented with the cue word ‘Rocket’. Possible associated answers could include ‘Blast’, or 
‘Space’. Conceptual priming is argued to be demonstrated by answering the cue words with 
previously encoded words, which appeared in the narrative, more frequently than other 
words. Successful retrieval of encoded words is assisted by conceptual priming. The 
conceptual task used three groups of randomised word lists: target-threat, non-target threat, 
and target-neutral. Each cue word contained a possible associated word that could be either 
the target (i.e., word in narrative) or another word (not in the narrative) matched by frequency 
in the English language (40 per million) (Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(COCA), 2008). The target and matched words had an average association of 4.4 (between 
the 3rd and 7th association) with the cue word taken from the Edinburgh Associative 
Thesaurus (2013). Thus, none of the associated words were the most common associative for 
the target word. For example, the cue Sand had as it most common associate word, Grains. 
But in this study the target word Desert was the third most common associated word, and its 
matched word, Beach, was the second most common associated word to that cue. Each 
participant was given two practice words, followed by feedback on their performance, before 
beginning the main trials. This task was modelled on a similar design used by Lyttle et al. 
(2010).  
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Trauma Film Paradigm Narrative Coding Schedule 
To be able to use the narrative data that participants recalled in the retrieval phase of 
the study, a perceptual/conceptual scale was used to code the data so they could be 
compared across conditions. This was to determine if dissociation at encoding or at retrieval 
impacted on the nature of the memory which represented the narrative.  
Perceptual and Conceptual Coding 
Each narrative transcript (i.e. from the retrieval phase of the study) was coded into 
utterances (clauses which contained only one thought, action, or speech utterance; e.g. He 
was taken in a taxi). Memory representations of the narrative were coded using a nine-point 
Likert scale (Buck et al., 2006; Kindt et al., 2007) to assess conceptual and perceptual 
memory processing, from 1 (exclusively conceptual representations and/or 
contextualisations) to 9 (exclusively perceptual representations). Utterances were given a 
number based on the ratio of conceptual to perceptual details. For example, the utterance 
They took him to an abandoned warehouse is given a score of 8 (They took him to an = 5 
perceptual details, abandoned warehouse = 2 contextual details).  Scores were averaged 
together to create an overall score for the participant. Perceptual representations might have 
included descriptions of people or places. Conceptual representations might have included 
explanations of why events occurred. Contextual details referenced location, date or time. 
The transcripts were coded by two independent raters. The intraclass correlation coefficient 
was .46 for 50 transcripts.    
Procedure 
For each participant, this study took place in two sessions over three days in a 
laboratory room in the Psychology Department at the University of Canterbury.  
Session One/Day One (Encoding): Participants arrived at the laboratory and 
completed the information and written consent process. Participants were then given a unique 
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identification code to determine which of the five experimental conditions they would be 
randomly allocated (see Appendix B). Participants were sequentially allocated across 
conditions and were unaware of their condition until the experiment had been completed. The 
researcher was required to be aware of their condition throughout the experiment.    
A list of instructions appeared on the computer screen, before participants completed 
a baseline task for three minutes. This was the task they were not exposed to during encoding 
(i.e., DEDR and DEPR conditions were given a picture task, PEDR and PEPR conditions 
were given a dissociation task). This was to counteract potential practice effects. Those in the 
LELR condition were instructed to sit quietly during this time. Participants then completed 
the demographic questionnaire, DES-II, DASS, and baseline MPDEQ and STAI-6 on the 
computer using Qualtrics software.  
Before completing the encoding task, participants observed for ten seconds on the 
screen a picture of the man in the story, followed by twenty seconds of the visual stimuli they 
would be exposed to during the encoding phase, without the narrative (i.e, TFP-A) playing. 
This allowed participants to become accustomed to the visual stimuli before the audio began. 
Following this, participants undertook encoding of the TFP-A. All participants listened to the 
narrative while engaged in (1) the dissociation task (looking at the spinning dot), (2) the 
neutral task (looking at neutral pictures) or (3) the listening task (listening to narrative 
without visual stimuli). After the narrative had finished, participants completed MPDEQ, 
STAI-6 and validity questionnaires regarding their experience of the TFP-A. Participants 
then completed the word-cue association task. Participants were issued with an intrusion 
diary which was explained in full by the researcher. At the end of the session, an incentive for 
participating was given (i.e., course credit or a $5 coffee voucher).  
 Session Two/Day Three (Retrieval): Participants returned to the laboratory where they 
were debriefed on their intrusion diary. Validity questions were then completed (using 
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Qualtrics software) to assess clarity and thought patterns about the story, which tested their 
metacognitive memory of the TFP-A narrative.    
Before completing the retrieval task, participants observed a picture of the man in the 
story displayed on the screen for ten seconds, followed by twenty seconds of the visual 
stimuli they were to be exposed to during the retrieval phase. This allowed participants to 
become accustomed to the visual stimuli before recounting what they remembered. 
Participants were then given 8.2 minutes (the length of the original narrative) to recall as 
much of the narrative as they could whilst completing one of the assigned condition tasks 
(i.e., dissociative task, picture task, no visual task). Their narrative recollection was audio 
recorded for later coding. When participants reported that they had remembered everything, 
they were prompted to remember any additional information. If a silence of 40 seconds 
occurred, the recording of their recall was stopped. After the retrieval section had finished, 
participants completed MPDEQ, STAI-6 and validity questionnaires regarding their 
experience during their recall of the TFP-A narrative. Participants were then fully debriefed 
on the experiment and given a list of support services should they need them. At the end of 
the session either course credit or a $10 shopping voucher was offered for participation. The 
study was approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (HEC 
2018/12) (See Appendix A).     
Data Analysis 
Data from the study was analysed using SPSS (25). For the demographic information, 
chi-square analyses were conducted to analyse categorical variables (gender, ethnicity, 
education, trauma variables and health variables) while a one-way analysis of variance was 
used to analyse age. A one-way analysis of variance was used to analyse DES (and DES 
taxon) and DASS questionnaires, while a repeated measures analysis of variance was used to 
analyse the STAI and MPDEQ questionnaires. The primary outcomes were conducted using 
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various analyses. A one-way analysis of variance was used to analyse the 
perceptual/conceptual recall scores, while a mixed analysis of variance was used to analyse 




















 A one-way analysis of variance to examine if the dissociation manipulation was 
effective showed no difference between groups for baseline levels of dissociation, F(2, 163) 
= .17, p = .84, p2 = .00 (see Table 1). However, a one-way ANOVA detected differences in 
state anxiety at baseline, F(2, 163) = 3.45, p = .03, p2 = .04. Gabriel’s test indicated higher 
levels of baseline anxiety in the spiral group compared to the picture group (p = .04). There 
were no significant differences in baseline levels of anxiety between the control and picture 
group (p = .97) or between the control and spiral group (p = .27; Table 1).  
 No significant differences were found between groups for encoding levels of 
dissociation, F(2, 163) = 2.48, p = .09, p2 = .03, or anxiety, F(2, 163) = .64, p = .53, p2 = 
.01 (see Table 1).  
 In addition, no significant differences were found between groups for retrieval levels 
of dissociation, F(2, 163) = .30, p = .74, p2 = .00, or anxiety, F(2, 163) = .22, p = .80, p2 = 
.00 (see Table 1).   
Table 1.  
Descriptive Statistics Showing the Mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) Across Groups for 
Peri-Experimental Levels of Dissociation and Anxiety.  
 Control  Picture Spiral  Total  
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Base. MPDEQ 19.93 (6.10) 19.66 (6.29) 20.31 (6.77) 19.98 (6.42) 
Base. STAI 10.03 (9.79) 9.79 (2.35) 11.07 (3.35) 10.36 (2.98) 
Enc. MPDEQ 19.30 (5.83) 19.38 (6.38)  21.53 (6.14) 20.25 (6.24) 
Enc. STAI 15.10 (4.30) 15.21 (4.13) 14.43 (4.26) 14.87 (4.21) 
Rec. MPDEQ 19.37 (5.44) 19.59 (6.35) 20.29 (6.80) 19.84 (6.37) 
Rec. STAI  12.07 (3.61) 12.17 (3.54) 12.51 (3.79) 12.30 (3.64) 
Note: Baseline Dissociation (Base. MPDEQ); Baseline Anxiety (Base. STAI);  
Encoding Dissociation (Enc. MPDEQ); Encoding Anxiety (Enc. STAI); Recall 
Dissociation (Rec. MPDEQ); Recall Anxiety (Rec. STAI).  
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Given the manipulation of dissociation did not appear to induce dissociation, a 
median split on peri-experimental dissociation scores at encoding (median = 20.5) and 
retrieval (median = 19) was performed to create four new groups for further analyses, 
identified by levels of low and high dissociation scores (i.e. Low encoding [LE], Low 
retrieval [LR]; High encoding [HE], High retrieval [HR]). The low dissociation group at 
encoding had a mean MPDEQ of 15.21 (SD = 3.30), while participants in the high encoding 
group had a mean score of 25.28 (SD = 4.03). For retrieval dissociation, the mean MPDEQ 
score for the low group was 17.43 (SD = 5.94), while the score for the high group was 22.25 
(SD = 5.88).  
Demographics 
Chi-squared analysis for demographic information showed no difference between the 
four groups on gender, 2 (6, N = 166) = 7.07, p = .32. Ethnicity and education were not 
subjected to analyses due to low counts in some cells (see Table 2). 
 A one-way ANOVA for age showed a marginally non-significant difference between 










Descriptive Statistics Showing the Number (n) and Total Percentage (%) of the Demographic 
Information Across Groups for Gender, Age, Ethnicity and Education.  
    LELR LEHR HELR HEHR Total 
  N/M N/M N/M N/M N/M 
  (%/SD) (%/SD) (%/SD) (%/SD) (%/SD) 
Sample 52 (31.3) 31 (18.7) 22 (13.3) 61 (36.7) 166 (100) 
Gender Male 19 (11.4)  15 (9.0)  5 (3.0)  18 (10.8)  57 (34.3)  
 Female 32 (19.3)  16 (9.6)  17 (10.2)  43 (25.9)  108 (65.1)  













Ethnicity NZ       
 European 31 (18.7)  17 (10.2)  15 (9.0)  46 (27.7)  109 (65.7)  
 Maori 7 (4.2)  4 (2.4)  0 (0)  1 (0.6)  12 (7.2)  
 Samoan 0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  1 (0.6)  1 (0.6)  
 Niuean 1 (0.6) 0 (0) 0 (0)  0 (0)  1 (0.6) 
 Chinese 0 (0)  2 (1.2)  2 (1.2)  3 (1.8)  7 (4.2)  
 Indian 2 (1.2)  1 (0.6)  1 (0.6)  3 (1.8)  7 (4.2)  
 Other 11 (6.6)  7 (4.2)  4 (2.4)  7 (4.2)  29 (17.5)  
Education Undergrad 47 (28.3)  29 (17.5)  21 (12.7)  55 (33.1)  152 (91.6)  
 Postgrad 3 (1.8)  2 (1.2)  1 (0.6)  4 (2.4)  10 (6.0)  
  Other 2 (1.2)  0 (0) 0 (0)  2 (1.2) 4 (2.4) 
 
Fifty-four participants had experienced a traumatic incident. Fifteen (28.3%) had 
experienced interpersonal trauma and 38 (71.7%) had experienced non-interpersonal trauma 
(see Table 3). One participant did not state what type of trauma they had experienced. Chi-
squared analysis showed no significant difference between the dissociation groups for 
experiences of trauma, 2 (3, N = 166) = .65, p = .88, type of trauma (interpersonal or non-
interpersonal), 2 (3, N = 53) = 1.91, p = .59, time since traumatic incident, 2 (9, N = 54) = 
8.11, p = .52 or whether participants still thought about the trauma, 2 (3, N = 54) = .79, p = 




Table 3.  
Descriptive Statistics Showing the Number (n) and Percentage (%) Across Groups for 
Trauma-Related Information. 
  LELR LEHR HELR HEHR Total 
    n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Trauma Yes 18 (10.8) 9 (5.4) 6 (3.6) 21 (12.7) 54 (32.5) 
 No 34 (20.5) 22 (13.3) 16 (9.6) 40 (24.1) 112 (67.5) 
Trauma 
Type* IP 7 (38.9) 2 (22.2) 2 (33.3) 4 (20.0) 15 (28.3) 




months 4 (22.2) 1 (10.0) 0 (0) 3 (15.0) 8 (14.8) 
 1-5 years 9 (50.0) 4 (40.0) 6 (100) 11 (55.0) 30 (55.6) 
 6-10 years 3 (16.7) 2 (20.0) 0 (0) 3 (15.0) 8 (14.8) 
 11+ years 2 (11.1) 3 (30.0) 0 (0) 3 (15.0) 8 (14.8) 
Still think* Yes  14 (77.8) 7 (70.0) 4 (66.7) 13 (65.0) 16 (70.4) 
  No  4 (22.2) 3 (30.0) 2 (33.3) 7 (35.0) 16 (29.6) 
Note: Interpersonal Trauma (IP); Non-Interpersonal Trauma (NI); Still Think About the 
Trauma (Still think). *Indicates % Within the Participants in Group, Not of Total 
Participants. 
 
Chi-squared analyses showed no significant difference between dissociation groups 
for having a mental health diagnosis, 2 (3, N =166) =3.31, p =.35, memory problem, 2 (3, N 
= 166) = 1.75, p = .63, hearing problem, 2 (3, N = 166) = 2.27, p = .52, vision problem, 2 
(3, N = 166) = 2.76, p = .43 or ever having loss of consciousness for more than 30 minutes, 









Table 4.  
Descriptive Statistics Showing the Number (n) and Percentage (%) Across Groups for Mental 
Health and Other Health Concerns.  
    LELR LEHR HELR HEHR Total 
    n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
MH Dx Yes 15 (9.0) 4 (2.4) 4 (2.4) 12 (7.2) 35 (21.1) 
 No 37 (22.3) 27 (16.3) 18 (10.8) 49 (29.5) 131 (78.9) 
Dx* Dep. 8 (53.3) 2 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 1 (8.3) 13 (37.1) 
 Anx. 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (8.3) 1 (2.9) 
 
Dep. & 
Anx. 5 (33.3) 1 (25.0) 1 (25.0) 5 (41.7) 12 (34.3) 
 PTSD 1 (6.7) 1 (25.0) 1 (25.0) 0 (0) 3 (8.6) 
 OCD 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (8.3) 1 (2.9) 
 Tourette's  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (8.3) 1 (2.9) 
 
Multiple 
(3+) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (25.0) 3 (8.6) 
 
Not 
Specified 1 (6.7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2.9) 
Memory 
Problem Yes 49 (29.5) 27 (16.3) 21 (12.7) 56 (33.7) 153 (92.2) 
 No 3 (1.8) 4 (2.4) 1 (0.6) 5 (3.0) 13 (7.8) 
Hearing 
Problem Yes 51 (30.7) 29 (17.5) 22 (13.3) 58 (34.9) 160 (96.4) 
 No 1 (0.6) 2 (1.2) 0 (0) 3 (1.8) 6 (3.6) 
Vision 
Problem Yes 46 (27.7) 25 (15.1) 21 (12.7) 54 (32.5) 146 (88.0) 
 No 6 (3.6) 6 (3.6) 1 (0.6) 7 (4.2) 20 (12.0) 
LC Yes 1 (0.6) 2 (1.2) 0 (0) 2 (1.2) 5 (3.0) 
  No 51 (30.7) 29 (17.5) 22 (13.3) 59 (35.5) 161 (97.0) 
Note: Mental Health Diagnosis (MH Dx); Diagnosis (Dx); Depression (Dep.); Anxiety 
(Anx.); Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD); 
Multiple Diagnoses (Multiple); Lost Consciousness (LC). * Indicates % Within the 
Participants in Group, Not of Total Participants. 
 
DES Total  
 A one-way analysis of variance showed a main effect of level of dissociation on 
overall DES scores, F(3, 162) = 11.86, p < .001, p2 = .18 (see Table 5). Gabriel’s test 
indicated significantly higher levels of dissociation in the LEHR group compared to the 
LELR group (p < .001) and significantly higher levels of trait dissociation in the HEHR 
group compared to the LELR group (p < .001). Seemingly, those with higher trait 
dissociation generally experienced more dissociation during the tasks.  
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DASS Scores  
 A one-way analysis of variance failed to show a main effect for level of dissociation 
on DASS depressive subscale items, F(3, 162) = 2.09, p = .10, p2 = .04. A similar result was 
present for DASS anxiety, F(3, 162) = 2.12, p = .10, p2 = .04, and DASS stress, F(3, 162) = 
2.12, p = .10, p2 = .04 (see Table 5).  
STAI –State Anxiety  
A 3 (time; baseline, encoding, retrieval) by 4 (group: LELR; LEHR; HELR; HEHR) 
mixed ANOVA on state anxiety scores produced a main effect for time (baseline, encoding 
and retrieval), F(2, 324) = 96.05, p < .001, p2 = .37 (see Table 5). Pairwise comparisons 
indicated significantly higher STAI scores at encoding compared to baseline (p < .001) and 
recall (p < .001). STAI scores were also significantly higher at recall than baseline (p < .001). 
No significant group main effect was found, F(3, 1621) = 1.71, p = .17, p2 = .03, nor was the 











Table 5.  
Descriptive Statistics Showing the Mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) Across Groups for 
Questionnaires. 
       
   LELR LEHR HELR HEHR Total 
    M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
























































































Note: DASS Depression Subscale Items (DASS Dep.); DASS Anxiety Subscale Items  
(DASS Anx.).      
 
Perceptual/Conceptual Recall Scores 
  A one-way between subjects ANOVA failed to indicate a main effect of level of 
dissociation on perceptual/conceptual rating scores, F(3, 162) = .33, p = .81, p2 = .01 (see 
Table 6). The average score from rater one was 7.70 (SD = .53) while the average score from 
rater two was 8.30 (SD = .44) (taken from 50 transcripts).     
Table 6.  
Descriptive Statistics Showing the Mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) Across Groups for 
Perceptual/Conceptual Task Recall Scores.  
  LELR LEHR HELR HEHR Total 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Perc/Conc 7.66 (.50) 7.73 (.57) 7.66 (.54) 7.75 (.53) 7.71 (.53) 
Note: Perceptual/Conceptual Rating Scores (Perc/Conc).  
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Word-Cue Association Task  
 A mixed ANOVA for conceptual priming on dissociation at encoding (low or high) 
by word type (target threat, non-target threat and target neutral) failed to produce a main 
effect for dissociation, F(1,164) = .36, p = .55, p2 = .00. However, the main effect for word 
type was significant, F(2, 163) = 113.38, p < .001, p2 = .58, with more conceptual priming 
for target threat words than non-target threat (p < .001) or target neutral words (p < .001). 
There was no significant interaction between group and word type, F(2, 163) = 2.52, p = .08, 
p2 = .03 (see Table 7).  
Intrusion Diaries 
A mixed ANOVA for frequency of intrusions on dissociation at encoding (low or 
high) by day (day one, two and three) failed to produce a main effect for dissociation, F(1, 
157) = 1.11, p = .29, p2 = .01. However, the main effect for day was significant, F(2,156) = 
63.89, p < .001, p2 = .45, with more intrusions on day one than day three (p < .001) and day 
two than day three (p < .001), but no differences were present between day one and day two 
(p = .33). There was no significant interaction between group and day, F(2,156) = .39, p = 
.67, p2 = .015 (see Table 7).   
A mixed ANOVA for distress of intrusions on dissociation at encoding by day 
produced a main effect for dissociation, F(1, 42) = 4.94, p = .03, p2 = .11. However, no 
significant differences were present for day, F(2, 41) = .11, p = .90, p2 = .01, nor was there a 





Table 7.  
Descriptive Statistics Showing the Mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) for Level of 
Dissociation at Encoding for the Word Cue Association Task and Intrusion Diaries.  
 
 For completeness, a correlational analysis was also performed to determine the 
relationship between conceptual priming and PTSD symptoms. The correlation between 
word-cue association task scores and intrusion frequency was weak (r = -.07, p = .40), as was 
the correlation between word-cue association task scores and distress of intrusions (r = .11, p 






  Low Diss. High Diss. Total  
    M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
WAT TarThreat 1.53 (.90) 1.80 (.96) 1.66 (.94) 
 NTarThreat 1.06 (1.06) 1.04 (.92) 1.05 (.99) 
 TarNeutral .46 (.65) .37 (.64) .42 (.64) 
Intrusion D. Day 1 Freq. 1.29 (1.12) 1.35 (1.21) 1.32 (1.16) 
 Day 2 Freq. 1.15 (1.15) 1.24 (1.09) 1.19 (1.12) 
 Day 3 Freq. .34 (.59) .54 (.77) .44 (.69) 
 Day 1 Dist. 2.14 (1.29) 2.62 (1.19) 2.43 (1.24) 
 Day 2 Dist. 1.93 (1.47) 2.79 (1.17) 2.45 (1.35) 
  Day 3 Dist. 1.71 (2.05) 2.69 (2.45) 2.31 (2.33) 
Note: Low Dissociation at Encoding (Low Diss.); High Dissociation at Encoding (High  
Diss.); Word-Cue Association Task (WAT); Target Threat Words (TarThreat); Non- 
Target Threat Words (NTarThreat); Target Neutral Words (TarNeutral); Intrusion 
Diaries (Intrusion D.); Day 1/2/3 Intrusion Frequency (Day 1/2/3 Freq.); Day 1/2/3 
Intrusion Distress (Day 1/2/3 Dist.). 
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Discussion 
Research has suggested a link between high levels of dissociation and PTSD 
symptoms (i.e. flashbacks) (McCaslin et al., 2008; Lyttle et al., 2010; Briere et al., 2005; 
Murray et al., 2002; Ozer et al., 2003; Werner & Griffin, 2012), although no studies have 
been able to do this successfully using the TFP-A in an analogue design. In addition, theories 
of dissociation have predicted that impaired conceptual processing is likely to occur during 
high levels of dissociation (Lyttle et al., 2010; Halligan et al., 2003; Olsen & Beck, 2012; 
Huntjens et al., 2013). This study examined if laboratory-induced dissociation may lead to 
analogue PTSD symptoms, and explored the role of impaired conceptual processing during 
this process.  
The spinning dot failed to induce dissociation. Therefore, spontaneous dissociation 
during encoding and retrieval was used as the independent variable.  
This study did not support the hypotheses that those who experienced dissociation at 
encoding would have less conceptually-based recall compared to other conditions, those who 
experienced dissociation at encoding would have impaired conceptual priming for target-
threat words compared to other conditions, or those who experienced dissociation at encoding 
would have more intrusions compared to other conditions.  
Questionnaires  
 The results of the DES suggested that, overall, those who had high trait dissociation 
experienced higher levels of state dissociation during the study (i.e., high state dissociation 
was correlated with high trait dissociation). This was in line with previous research which 
had also noted a significant relationship between state and trait dissociation (Lyttle et al., 
2010; Condon & Lynn, 2014).  
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 The sub-measures of the DASS (depression, anxiety and stress) did not show a 
significant relationship with dissociation. The results from the STAI indicated higher overall 
levels of anxiety at encoding compared to baseline and retrieval in all groups. This suggested 
that the narrative was effective in producing an elevated arousal response when listening 
about a man being kidnapped and tortured by terrorists. This replicated the findings of 
previous studies (Krans et al., 2010; Dorahy et al., 2016) that suggested an audio-version of 
the TFP was comparable to the standard TFP as a means of inducing heightened analogue 
trauma.   
Dissociation and Conceptual Processing 
 Contrary to current theories of PTSD, this study failed to support the role of 
conceptual processing in PTSD. There was no relationship between dissociation and impaired 
conceptual priming for target-threat words across groups. This suggested that target-threat 
words in general were more salient across conditions and that dissociation did not influence 
processing pattern. This result replicated the findings of Dorahy et al., (2016) and Lyttle et 
al., (2010) who also failed to find a link between dissociation and conceptual priming using a 
word-cue association task. One possible explanation for this finding could be that although 
target-threat words were more emotional compared to target-neutral words and in theory 
were more likely to be identified (Scott, O’Donnell, Leuthold, & Sereno, 2009), they may not 
have been sufficiently emotional to be influenced by dissociation. Furthermore, the results 
may be difficult to generalise to a clinical population, as identifying stimuli related to lived 
trauma is likely more powerful than identification with analogue stimuli in a word task. 
Future research should follow a similar procedure to Lyttle et al., (2010) and investigate the 
effects of conceptual priming in a clinical population to enhance the ecological validity of the 
study.       
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Interestingly, however, this study found that higher conceptual processing was 
associated with target-threat words compared to non-target threat or target neutral words, 
regardless of group. While this result contradicted the hypothesis based on the findings of 
Lyttle et al. (2010), it was a replication of a result from a recent study by Dorahy et al. 
(2016). This finding may have been due to the use of a non-clinical sample, which may have 
shown higher conceptual processing, and therefore higher conceptual priming in response to 
a low-level threat. This is compared to the clinical sample used by Lyttle et al. (2010), which 
may have shown reduced conceptual priming in response to distressing stimuli (similar to 
their own trauma experiences) (Dorahy et al., 2016).  
The results from the narrative recall indicated no difference in the level of conceptual 
detail between high and low dissociation groups. A recent study which investigated a similar 
link between dissociation and conceptual processing using the same perceptual/conceptual 
rating scale also failed to find an association (Hooper, Dorahy, Blampied, & Jordan, 2014).  
Several theories could account for why the results for this analysis were not 
significant. Firstly, although the perceptual/conceptual scale used for this study had been 
validated in other studies (Buck et al., 2006; Kindt et al., 2007) and ranged from one to nine, 
the recall scores found in this study clustered near the perceptual end (the lowest score for a 
participant’s transcript was 6.24, while the overall average transcript score was 7.71). The 
trauma narrative itself may have influenced these scores, as the story was later coded by 
researcher two using the same perceptual/conceptual rating scale as the recall narratives, and 
was given a rating of 8.41 (indicating strong perceptual content). Giving the participants a 
significantly perceptually-based task may have explained why the recall scores were closely 
grouped around the perceptual end of the scale with little variance. In short, the scale in this 
study failed to capture conceptual priming, and while reduced conceptual processing was 
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predicted, it may not have been evident in this scale because of the actual content in the 
experimental narrative.  
Another possible explanation for this finding could relate to the complex nature of 
conceptual processing. Although some studies have found a link between processing style 
and narrative recall details, this association seems to disappear when dissociation is included. 
For example, although the findings from Hooper et al. (2014) suggested that impaired 
conceptual processing in individuals who experienced the 2011 6.3 magnitude earthquake in 
Christchurch may have been related to an increase in PTSD symptoms, no association was 
found between state dissociation and impaired conceptual processing. Furthermore, the 
association between processing style and increased PTSD symptoms may have been the 
result of increased perceptual processing relative to conceptual processing, leaving the exact 
role of conceptual processing unclear. It is uncertain why this association disappears when 
dissociative experiences are taken into consideration. However, it likely suggests that 
conceptual processing has a far more complicated relationship with dissociation than 
perceptual processing, and that the latter is influenced by dissociation more than the former.  
Although this study did not find a significant relationship between dissociation and 
conceptual processing, the role of conceptual processing should not be discounted entirely in 
trauma models. Many theories of PTSD have proposed that conceptual processing is a 
complex process that is currently not well understood, although it likely has an important role 
in peritraumatic experiences. Furthermore, as many studies have failed to show an 
association between impaired conceptual processing and PTSD symptoms, the results of this 
study could argue that perceptual processing and conceptual processing exist as independent 
systems (proposed by dual representation theory, Brewin et al., 1996). The positive 
association often found between perceptual processing and PTSD symptoms, along with 
failing to find an association between conceptual processing and PTSD symptoms may 
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indicate these processing mechanisms are not directly inversely related, but exist as separate 
systems.  
Dissociation and Intrusions  
This study failed to find an association between high levels of spontaneous 
dissociation and increased frequency of analogue trauma intrusions. Findings from previous 
studies have been mixed. Both Holmes et al., (2004) and Mairean and Ceobanu (2017) found 
that increases in spontaneous state dissociation after viewing a traumatic film predicted an 
increase in frequency of intrusions. However, other studies have failed to replicate this 
finding (Laposa & Rector, 2012; Hagenaars & Krans, 2011). It is currently unclear why 
different studies have found mixed results. One possible explanation for the finding in this 
study may be that dissociation at low levels measured in the laboratory, even if the exposure 
to unpleasant stimuli was present, may not have been potent enough to bring about increases 
in the frequency of intrusions. Future studies may benefit from investigating this link in a 
clinical sample immediately after experiencing an autobiographical distressing event, as this 
may likely provide a better understanding of the true relationship between dissociation and 
increased frequency of intrusions.    
Despite the absence of a link between dissociation and subsequent traumatic 
intrusions, the frequency of intrusive memories decreased over the course of the three days 
following the TFP-A in all groups, suggesting there was some initial impact on participants 
from the distressing narrative. Although the frequency of intrusions did not significantly 
decrease on day two, intrusions significantly decreased and were very low by the third day. 
Although the distress of intrusions did not change over three days, those in the high 
dissociation group experienced their intrusions as more distressing compared to the low 
dissociation group. One possible explanation for this finding is that those who experienced 
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high levels of dissociation may have had impaired processing of emotional material by not 
allowing emotional integration with other experiences and thereby not reducing initial 
distress associated with intrusions (DePrince & Freyd, 1999). This result was in line with a 
previous finding by Dorahy et al., (2016) and may suggest that the distress of intrusions could 
be a better predictor of PTSD symptoms than intrusion frequency (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, 
& Clark, 2005; Dorahy et al., 2016). Hagenaars and Krans (2011) also suggested that 
dissociation was a symptom of severe distress that better predicted PTSD symptoms rather 
than induced dissociation using experimental manipulation. A mediation analysis could be 
useful in future studies to determine whether the distress of intrusions mediates the 
relationship between dissociation and other PTSD symptoms.  
Conceptual Processing and PTSD Symptoms 
 This study failed to replicate this findings of Lyttle et al., (2010) which found a link 
between conceptual processing and PTSD symptoms in a sample of PTSD patients. However, 
the results of this study paralleled findings from Kindt et al., (2008) and Buck et al., (2009) 
which failed to find a link between conceptual processing and intrusion frequency using a 
non-clinical sample. This may suggest that the attempts to control conceptual processing in 
this study were relatively ineffective at predicting intrusion frequency, as conceptual 
processing has also been linked to PTSD symptoms using a non-clinical sample (Michael & 
Ehlers, 2007). Given the proposed link between distress of intrusions and PTSD symptoms, 
future studies may wish to further investigate the role that conceptual processing may have in 
this relationship in clinical and non-clinical samples.   
Strengths and Limitations 
 One of the primary strengths of this study was the use of an analogue design to assess 
the relationship between dissociation, conceptual processing and PTSD symptoms. This was 
to control for PTSD variables while manipulating dissociation, which no prior study has been 
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able to do successfully using the TFP. Taking pre-existing PTSD characteristics into account 
(such as prior history of trauma) gave greater control over mediating factors. Overall, the 
experimental design ensured a well-controlled study in a laboratory environment with a 
standardised procedure.  
 Furthermore, the analogue study design allowed for a large sample size, which is 
often a restrictive component of clinical research. The total sample of 179 study participants 
was relatively large compared to other studies in the same field of research.   
Despite the strengths of this study, several limitations may have influenced the 
outcomes. Firstly, the spinning dot did not produce elevated levels of dissociation. This was 
an unexpected finding as the spinning dot was near-identical to that used by Dorahy et al. 
(2016) which had successfully produced higher levels of dissociation compared to a control 
condition. One contributing factor in this study could have been that the spinning dot 
stimulus used may have been ineffective at inducing sufficient levels of dissociation. 
Including a red cross to ensure attention in this study may have achieved a result opposite to 
that intended and broken concentration on the task (i.e. disrupted the dissociative state) and 
lessened the potency of the stimulus to produce dissociation and resultantly heightened 
analogue intrusions. Although this result was not significant, it was in line with some 
previous studies which have attempted to induce dissociation in non-clinical samples with 
little success (Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes et al., 2004). Dissociation appears difficult 
to induce in the laboratory and induction techniques should follow the exact procedures that 
have been successfully implemented in other studies. Analogue procedures may be relatively 
ineffective at measuring trauma outcomes compared to lived dissociative experiences (Marks 
et al., 2018).  
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 Another limitation was the poor interrater reliability for coding of the 
perceptual/conceptual transcript scores. Although this indicated some incongruence in coding 
scores between raters, it likely did not influence the overall outcome of the rating scores as 
the narrative was highly perceptually-ladened, as noted earlier. Both, however, showed a 
strong leaning towards perceptual ratings. For example, the lowest score given to an 
individual’s transcript (6.24) still contained more perceptual content than conceptual.  
 Technological and generational considerations may also help explain the findings of 
this study. Many of the participants noted during the study that the trauma story they listened 
to did not elicit a distressing response or an empathic connection with the story of the man in 
the narrative. With the rapid growth of technology and easily accessible explicit media 
(especially for a younger audience), by today’s standards, the TFP-A may not have been an 
effective trauma-analogue compared to when the original TFP was developed. While anxiety 
was elevated, the stimuli may not have been emotive enough to produce an effect. This 
desensitisation effect could explain why many of the results were not significant, and why 
using a younger, technologically-savvy sample may have been a limitation of this study.   
Finally, using an analogue study design decreased the ecological validity of the 
results. For example, using an analogue stimulus to induce dissociation, in addition to an 
analogue induction of trauma (TFP-A) will not have had the same potency as experiencing a 
traumatic event first-hand. This may make the results difficult to generalise to a clinical 
sample. In addition, this study design used a non-clinical sample of mostly college-aged 
undergraduate students, which also may make the findings difficult to generalise to a clinical 
population.    
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Directions for Future Research  
Despite not finding a link between conceptual processing, dissociation and PTSD 
symptoms in this study, further research is warranted. Future studies would benefit from 
investigating conceptual processing using a similar analogue design, while using alternative 
measures of conceptual processing. An example may include a category instance generation 
task (Robert et al., 1997) where participants are asked to name as many items as possible in a 
given category (e.g. animals) in a limited time period. This is a form of free-association task 
which facilitates conceptual processing through semantic meaning retrieval mechanisms. 
Alternatively, this task could also be used to assess impaired conceptual processing in a 
clinical population of recent victims of trauma.     
A similar analogue design using a different visual stimulus to induce dissociation 
could also benefit future studies. Although it was not entirely clear why the spinning dot did 
not induce the desired level of dissociation in this study, other dissociation-inducing stimuli 
could be used instead such as the mirror staring task (Dorahy et al., 2016). In this task, 
participants look at a mirror and stare intently into their own eyes during the presentation of 
the trauma stimulus. Using alternative dissociation-inducing stimuli in future research may 
further the understanding of the role of dissociation in an analogue study design. Efforts 
should also be made to develop stimuli which produce a similar effect to that of real-life 
dissociation, but still fall under the scope of ethically-approved research.      
In addition, a more potent trauma analogue may need to be considered given the high 
levels of self-reported exposure to fast-paced, intense material with graphic violence common 
in study participants. This could potentially be measured and controlled for in future studies. 
Any modified simulated trauma would obviously have to balance the ethical imperative not 
to harm study participants with a realistic portrayal of a traumatic stimulus.      
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Conclusions     
This study did not find a relationship between spontaneous dissociation and intrusion 
frequency or conceptual priming. However, high levels of dissociation were associated with 
more intrusion distress.  
In light of these findings, the role of conceptual processing in trauma remains unclear. 
Few studies have been successful in linking dissociation with impaired conceptual 
processing, which may be due to the complex nature of how memory is processed during 
trauma and the limitations of replicating trauma in an analogue study with a non-clinical 
sample. What is clear, however, is that conceptual processing during an acute traumatic 
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Appendix C. Information Form  
 
  College of Science 
Department of Psychology 





The Role of Dissociation and Memory in Analogue Distressing Narratives 
Information Sheet for Participants 
My name is Michelle Downs-Woolley and I am a PhD Candidate in the Department of Psychology, 
and the principal researcher for this project. Gareth Faulkner is a Masters Student also working on 
this project. You are invited to take part in our research project entitled “The Role of Dissociation 
and Memory in Analogue Distressing Narratives”. 
 
This study aims to look at the effect that dissociation has on how people take in and remember 
information. Dissociation is the unintentional disruption in the normal integration of your 
experience into memory, where you lose track of what is going on around you by mentally 
switching off (i.e., daydreaming, working on auto-pilot). The study is split into two sessions:  
1. Where participants receive information by listening to a story via an audio recording,  
2. Where we ask participants to recall the story 
These two sessions will be three days apart, and you will be required to attend both sessions to 
complete the study. The narrative that participants listen to depicts a journalist who was kidnapped 
by a terrorist group, tortured and ultimately killed. This narrative is based on a true story, and was 
compiled using first-hand accounts of those who were in captivity with the journalist and survived.  
In the first session participants are given a number of questionnaires about their experiences during 
the study. When participants are listening to the story they will have to complete a visual task on 
the computer screen. We will also get you to complete two word tasks, one where you will be given 
a word, and then have to say the first word that comes into their head (word association task); the 
second where we give you the start of a word, and then you have to finish it (word stem task). At 
the end of session 1, participants are given a diary to record the amount of times they think about 
the story between sessions. 
The second session will take place three days later, where participants will be asked to hand in their 
diary.  Participants are then asked to recall the story in as much detail as they can, whilst completing 
another visual task. These recollections will be recorded. Participants will again be given short 
questionnaires regarding their experience. 
 
Below is a schedule, and time estimates for each part of the experiment. 
Measure Assessment Approximate time taken 
Session One  
Consent 5 minutes 
Baseline measures 3 minutes 
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Questionnaires 15 minutes  
Listen to Narrative 8 minutes 
Questionnaires 2 minutes 
Word Tasks  10 minutes 
Thought Diary A few minutes over the course of three days 
Session Two  
Recalling Narrative 10 minutes 
Questionnaires 5 minutes 
 
In the performance of the tasks and application of the procedures there are risks of participants 
becoming distressed due to the content of the story. The narrative in the story is taken from true 
events and does depict potentially distressing events, such as torture and death. A list of support 
services is provided at the end of this document should you wish to talk to anyone about any distress 
that lingers after the study. You are also free to contact one of the researchers or their supervisor 
(Martin Dorahy, clinical psychologist) about your experience. 
 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any stage without penalty. You 
may ask for your raw data to be returned to you or destroyed at any point. If you withdraw, I will 
remove information relating to you. However, once analysis of raw data starts in October 2018, it 
will become increasingly difficult to remove the influence of your data on the results. If you were 
recruited via the PSYC105/106 Participant Pool you will receive 3 credits; whereas students 
recruited outside of the pool you will receive a $5 coffee voucher after the first session, and a $10 
Westfield voucher at the conclusion of the second session. 
 
The results of this project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete confidentiality 
of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public without your prior 
consent. To ensure confidentiality no names will be used on the assessments or in the final report, 
nor will there be a record (once data has been added to the computer) of any identifying 
information. Any and all information that has identifying features (such as the consent form), will 
be kept by Michelle and Gareth, in their locked office, where the diaries will also be stored. The 
diaries will not have any personal identification, bar participant codes (i.e., Participant 1). Only the 
research team (e.g., Michelle Downs-Woolley, Gareth Faulkner, Martin Dorahy) will have access 
to the data, which will be stored securely and electronically by password protection. After the 
conclusion of the experiment Martin Dorahy will keep a copy of the data for ten years, after which 
it will be destroyed (this includes Intrusion Diaries). A thesis is a public document and will be 
available through the UC Library. 
 
This project is being carried out as a requirement for a PhD Thesis by Michelle Downs-Woolley, 
and a Masters thesis by Gareth Faulkner, under the supervision of Professor Martin Dorahy who 
can be contacted at the email addresses below. Michelle, Gareth or Martin are be happy to address 
any concerns you have about participation in the project. If you agree to participate in the study, 
you are asked to complete a consent form. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 




Gareth Faulkner Michelle Downs-Woolley Martin Dorahy 










Samaritans: 0800 726 666 
Lifeline: 0800 543 354 
Health Line: 0800 611 116 
 
Counselling services 
University of Canterbury Counselling service: (03) 364 2402 
Petersgate Counselling Service: (03) 343 3391 
 
Emergency services 













Appendix D. Consent Form  
College of Science 
Department of Psychology 
Telephone: +64 3  
Email: michelle.downs-woolley@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or 
gareth.faulkner@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
The Role of Dissociation and Memory in Analogue Distressing Narratives 
Consent Form for Participants 
Name of researchers: Martin Dorahy (Clinical Psychologist/Professor, University of Canterbury); 
Michelle Downs-Woolley (PhD Candidate, University of Canterbury, Intern Psychologist); Gareth 
Faulkner (Masters Student, University of Canterbury); Simon Kemp (Professor, University of 
Canterbury). 
Expected date of completion of study: December 2018.  
□ I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
□ I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
□ I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time 
without penalty. Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of 
any information I have provided should this remain practically achievable. 
□ I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the 
researchers, and that any published or reported results will not identify the participants. I 
understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC 
Library. 
□ I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure 
facilities and/or in password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after ten 
years.  
□ I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be managed. 
□ I understand that I can contact the researchers (Michelle Downs-Woolley at 
michelle.downs-woolley@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or Gareth Faulkner at 
gareth.faulkner@pg.canterbury.ac.nz ) or supervisor  (Martin Dorahy 
martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz) for further information. If I have any complaints, I 
can contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, 
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
□ I understand that my recollections will be audio recorded. 
□ I would like a summary of the results of the project (optional).   
□ By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project. 
 
Name: _____Signed: ___Date: 
       Email address:   
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Appendix E. Instructions for Experiment  
 
Baseline Spinning Dot Condition Instructions:  
 
For the next 3 minutes you will be required to watch a spinning dot in the centre of 
the screen. Please do not remove your gaze away from the centre of the dot. A red 
cross will randomly appear in the middle of the screen. When this happens please 
push the button indicated by the researcher on the box in front of you. 
 
If your gaze moves away from the centre of the screen the researcher will gently 
redirect you back.  
 
Baseline Picture Condition Instructions: 
 
For the next 3 minutes you will be required to watch pictures move about the screen. 
Follow these pictures as they appear. Please do not remove your gaze away from the 
pictures. Red crosses will randomly appear about the screen. When this happens 
please push the button indicated by the researcher on the box in front of you. 
 
If your gaze moves away from the pictures on the screen the researcher will gently 
redirect you back.  
 
Baseline Control Condition Instructions: 
 
For the next 3 minutes you will be required to sit quietly. Whilst you are sitting 
quietly, let your mind wander naturally.  
 
Encoding Spinning Dot Condition Instructions:  
 
We are going to test your memory. You are about to hear an audio clip depicting a 
first hand account of a man being kidnapped and tortured by terrorists. This clip is 
around 8 minutes long. A picture of this man will be presented for approximately 10 
seconds before the visual stimuli begins. After 20 seconds the audio clip will begin. 
 
We want you to listen carefully to the narrative, as you will be asked to recall it in 
detail. Try to focus on the meaning of the story and what is happening. During this 
clip you will be required to watch a spinning dot in the centre of the screen. If your 




During the narrative red crosses will appear randomly in the centre of the spinning 
dot. Whenever this happens, please press the button indicated on the box in front of 
you. If you feel the need to stop at any time, please let the researcher know. 
 
Encoding Picture Condition Instructions: 
 
We are going to test your memory. You are about to hear an audio clip depicting a 
first hand account of a man being kidnapped and tortured by terrorists. This clip is 
around 8 minutes long. A picture of this man will be presented for approximately 10 
seconds before the visual stimuli begins. After 20 seconds the audio clip will begin. 
 
We want you to listen carefully to the narrative, as you will be asked to recall it in 
detail. Try to focus on the meaning of the story and what is happening. During this 
clip you will be required to watch pictures travel around the screen. If your gaze 
moves away from the pictures on the screen the researcher will gently redirect you 
back.  
 
During the narrative red crosses will appear randomly on the screen. Whenever this 
happens, please press the button indicated on the box in front of you. If you feel the 
need to stop at any time, please let the researcher know. 
 
Encoding Control Condition Instructions: 
 
We are going to test your memory. You are about to hear an audio clip depicting a 
first hand account of a man being kidnapped and tortured by terrorists. This clip is 
around 8 minutes long. A picture of this man will be presented for approximately 10 
seconds before the screen goes dark. After 20 seconds the audio clip will begin. 
 
We want you to listen carefully to the narrative, as you will be asked to recall it in 
detail. Try to focus on the meaning of the story and what is happening. If you feel the 
need to stop at any time, please let me know. 
 
Retrieval Spinning Dot Condition Instructions:  
 
I’m going to ask you to recall the memories of the narrative as vividly as possible, and 
in the order the events occurred. 
 
Please recall this as best as you can. 
 
Please watch the screen in front of you, keeping your gaze focused on the spinning 
dot in the middle of the screen. If your gaze moves away from the dot, the researcher 
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will gently redirect you back.  
 
When a red cross appears please press the button on the box in front of you. Tell me 
what happened during the narrative in as much detail as you remember. This includes 
details about the character’s activities. 
 
Retrieval Picture Condition Instructions: 
 
I’m going to ask you to recall the memories of the narrative as vividly as possible, and 
in the order the events occurred. 
 
Please recall this as best as you can. 
 
Please watch the screen in front of you, keeping your gaze focused on following the 
pictures as they move about the screen. If your gaze moves away from the pictures the 
researcher will gently redirect you back.  
 
When a red cross appears please press the button on the box in front of you. Tell me 
what happened during the narrative in as much detail as you remember. This includes 
details about the character’s activities. 
 
Retrieval Control Condition Instructions: 
 
I’m going to ask you to recall the memories of the narrative as vividly as possible, and 
in the order the events occurred. 
 
Please recall this as best as you can.  
 
Tell me what happened during the narrative in as much detail as you remember. This 












Appendix F. Trauma-Audio Narrative (TFP-A) 
 
Capture 
My name is Max Jones, and I am a freelance journalist filing reports from Syria. I was 
travelling with Jack Castle, a British photographer. Jack and I were only 40 minutes from the 
Turkish border when we stopped at an internet café to upload our stories and photographs.  
A tall man with eyes of pure evil and a big beard hiding most of his face came in. He went to 
a computer and sat for only a minute before leaving.  
Once our task was complete, we packed up, and hailed a taxi for the drive to Turkey along 
with our local translator.  
As we were winding through the streets a van sped up behind our taxi and cut us off. Masked 
fighters streamed out of the van, brandishing weapons and screaming at us in Arabic to lie on 
the pavement. They handcuffed us and threw us unceremoniously in to the van.  
 
Interrogation One 
We were taken to an abandoned factory and placed in separate cells. Armed guards stripped 
us of our personal belongings, their faces, actions and eyes all promising pain if we did not 
comply immediately. They then demanded the passwords for all our electronic devices. I 
refused and was beaten. The explosions of agony were unlike those I’d ever experienced, and 
I lost consciousness. I awoke, face down on the horrible, cold and sticky concrete floor. It 
wasn’t until I sat up that I realised the stickiness was my own blood. They once again asked 
for my passwords, and I gave them immediately. As a consequence for my initial reluctance I 
was rewarded with a vicious kick to my ribs. The pain I felt whenever I breathed confirmed 
to me that I had broken ribs, leaving me unable to take more than shallow breaths.  
They left me in my cell for hours without food or water, with nothing to distract me from the 
pain I felt. I was not, however, without hope. Surely someone would rescue us.  Then my cell 




I screamed and tried to fight back as they dragged me out, my ribs and chest aching the whole 
time. I was heaved into a room and handcuffed to a rail above my head. All of my electronics 
were strewn across a table. They had checked my laptop, tablet and phone for information 
about me and my work. They thought I was a spy. I was stripped and suspended naked whilst 
they checked for a GPS chip hidden under my skin, or a microphone within my clothes. They 
left me there and then came back with knives, chains and a steel poker that they heated red-
hot over a fire. Each was used on me repeatedly as they took immense pleasure in 
dehumanizing me. I could feel each instrument penetrating, piercing and searing my skin. I 
screamed as they burned and whipped me. The wounds were instantly cauterized by the hot 
bar, so I did not bleed to death. There were no reasons for their actions other than punishment 
and their own amusement. No questions were asked, no information demanded.  
 
Torture Two 
We were eventually moved to a basement prison underneath a Hospital, where my torture 
continued. Sometimes cruel beatings would occur, and at other times a more heinous act 
would take place in a room we called “The Shower”.  My first visit to that room was burned 
into my memory like the scars of torture were burned into my flesh. The room was pitch 
black beyond the pool of light in the centre, but you could hear the sound of water. I was 
forced to lie on a table in a reclining position, with a cloth sack over my head. I can still feel 
it’s rough texture scraping my face and restricting my breathing. Without any warning a 
torrent of ice-cold water was poured over my face and into my mouth. I couldn’t breathe. I 
couldn’t see. I was drowning on dry land, and my gaolers were laughing. They revelled in my 
pain. The burn in my throat as I tried to breathe was driving me insane. Even when the water 
stopped I couldn’t breathe - the wet sack over my face was preventing that. This went on for 
hours. Or at least I was told it was hours. Time meant nothing in that room. You were 
marooned on an island of terror, with no air, no light, and no one to help you. When we saw 
hostages brought back to the cell we waited to see if they were covered in blood or water. 




After about 13 months of this horror we were told to hand over the email addresses of our 
nearest relatives so they could be sent ransom notes. I gave the address of my youngest 
brother. I could only gain some small relief knowing that at least my family would know that 
I was alive. I was beginning to feel hopeful. I might go home. It was then we realised that 
only certain prisoners were being routinely freed.  Freedom came for those whose countries 
paid ransoms – my country did not. The realisation crushed me. It was then that I knew I was 
never getting out.  
 
The End 
I am scared to die. The cell door opens, and I am forced to wear an orange jumpsuit and a 
cloth bag over my head. My hands were bound with rope. For the first time in months I am 
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led out side. I am shoved into a vehicle. After what seems like hours I am led out of the 
vehicle and the bag is taken off my head. I see desert. I see black clad figures. I see cameras. 
And I see a sharp blade, shimmering in the blazing light of the sun. I am led to a point in 
front of the camera and placed on my knees. One of the black clad figures steps up beside me 
and picks up the long, sharp blade. The Arabic word for action is yelled out, and the cameras 
are turned on. I do not listen to the ugly words of anger and self-righteousness that my 
executioner is spouting, I am done with this world. I wait, and wait until finally I feel the icy 




























Appendix G. Word-Cue Association Task  
 
 Word Association Target Neutral Words 
 
 
Word Association Target Threat Words 
Cue Word Total 
Frequency 
Frequency 








per Million  
Torment  1,216 2.11 3 Torture 7,689 13.31 
Hurt 43,203 74.81 6 Painful 13,431 23.26 
Bad 123,592 214.01 5 Evil 19,968 34.58 
Nasty 7,397 12.81 5 Horrible 11,557 20.01 
Freezing 5,337 9.24 3 Cold 70,610 122.27 
Averages 36,149 62.60  4.4  24,651 42.69 
 
 
Word Association Non-Target Threat Words 












Slaughter 3,931 6.81 5 Killing 27,705 47.97 
Blast 8,591 14.88 3 Bomb 18,711 32.40 
Dislike 2,938 5.09 6 Hate(d)  26,194 45.36 
Thief 4,015 6.95 5 Steal 8,438 14.61 
Horns 3,740 6.48 4 Devil 9,130 15.81 
Averages 4,643 8.04 4.6  18,035.6 31.23 
 
The frequency per million was by taking the total frequency (1990-2017) divide it by 
577,500,000 (number of words total in Corpus), then multiplied by 1,000,000 – thus creating 

















Sand 21,112 36.56 3 Desert 21,312 36.90 
Patient 45,040 77.99 7 Hospital 66,553 115.24 
Enjoyment 3,485 6.03 5 Amusement 3,785 6.55 
Newspaper 31,283 54.17 3 Journalism 8,556 14.82 
Boundary 4,965 8.60 3 Border 32,470 56.23 
Averages  21,177 36.67 4.2  132,676 45.95 
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Appendix H. Intrusion Diary  
 
Date and Time of Original Session: Date/Time of Next Session: 
 
____________________                 ___________________ 
Intrusion Diary 
Over the next 3 days please take time to fill out the following thought diary (starting as soon 
as you leave today).  
 
We would ask you to put in any thoughts/memories/images about the scenario you heard at 
the lab, occurring when you had not intended to think about the scenario. These are called 
intrusive images and occur spontaneously, not when you are intentionally thinking about 
the project. 
 
You are being asked to record the number of intrusions you have, when you have them, a 
brief description of the intrusion, the type of intrusion you have, the feelings that 















13. Other: Please 
state. 
Distress Scale:  
0 – Totally relaxed, no emotion 
1- Alert and awake, concentrating well, or an inkling of feeling something 
2- Minimal emotion 
3- Mild emotion, no interference with performance 
At the end of the 3 days, before you come to the Lab, please fill out this 
next question: 
To what extent did you feel you were able to record in the diary all your 
thoughts/memories/feelings about the story you heard on a scale of 0 
(Never remembered to write down the thoughts/memories/feelings) to 
10 (Always remembered to write down the thoughts/memories/feelings) 




4- Somewhat upset to the point that you cannot easily ignore an unpleasant thought. 
You can handle it ok but don’t feel good. 
5- Moderate emotion, uncomfortable but can continue to perform 
6- Feeling emotion to the point that you begin to think something ought to be done 
about the way you feel. 
7- Quite emotional, interfering with performance 
8- Very emotional, can’t concentrate 
9- Extremely emotional 
10- Highest emotion you have ever felt. 
Intrusion Type: 
Audio (A): a line of dialogue or voice from the narrative intrudes into your thought process. 
Visual (V): A picture or image. 
Audio and Visual (AV):  A combination of both an audio and visual intrusion. 
 
You will receive an email prompt each morning to complete your intrusion diary. Please 
try and keep this on you at all times, and record whenever you have an intrusion. Please be 
as accurate as possible in your descriptions. If you need a new diary at any time, please feel 
free to contact the researcher at: michelle.downs-woolley@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
 




 Time Description of Intrusion and Trigger  Type of 
Intrusion 

















Hearing my lecturer’s voice saying 
“The test is worth 30% of your 
grade” in my thoughts when I started 
to study. 
 
Image of a failed exam paper burst 
into my mind when I was sitting 






















 Time Description of Intrusion and Trigger  Type of 
Intrusion 
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DAY TWO: 



































































 Time Description of Intrusion and Trigger  Type of 
Intrusion 
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Appendix I. Debrief Form  
 
Department of Psychology 
Telephone: +64 03 369 4337 




The Role of Dissociation and Memory in Analogue Distressing Narratives 
 
This study was interested in the effect that dissociation whilst listening to, and recalling 
emotional information, has on memory. Dissociation is the unintentional disruption in the 
normal integration of your experience into memory, where you lose track of what is going on 
around you by mentally switching off (i.e., daydreaming, working on auto-pilot, zoning out). 
It includes times where events are happening in front of you, but your brain is not paying 
attention. To help us examine this we gathered information using the Dissociative Experiences 
Scale - II (DES-II) (propensity to dissociate), the Modified Peritraumatic Dissociation 
Experiences Questionnaire (M-PDEQ) (current dissociation), the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory-6 (STAI-6), and the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS).  
To investigate this further, we got participants to listen to a story, and then in the next 
session recall it, to assess not only what they remembered but how they remembered it. To do 
this we divided participants randomly into five groups. We then used the audio version of the 
Trauma Film Paradigm (TFP-A) where participants listened to a narrative of a journalist who 
was captured by a terrorist group. Variations on the TFP have been used to study memory and 
trauma for a long time (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Details of this story were taken from 
interviews with other hostages who were in captivity but survived. This narrative is told from 
the first person point of view to capture the experience. The names in the narrative were 
changed to protect their identities and as a mark of respect. An article by the New York Times 
was used as the main source of information.  
Visual tasks were used to control participants ability to dissociate. A third of the participants 
watched a spiral to induce dissociation, another third watched neutral pictures on the screen as 
a non-dissociation condition, whilst the final third were a control group and listened to the story 
as usual, that is, without having a visual focus.  We also needed to check whether these tasks 
had an influence on dissociation or anxiety levels, so these tasks were also given without audio 
before the story was heard. To keep the stimuli novel however, participants only completed the 
baseline measures, which they were not going to receive whilst listening to the narrative. 
We are also interested in how memories are recalled; therefore, participants returned to 
the lab three days later and were asked to recount as much information about the story as 
possible. We were again interested in how dissociation affected memory; therefore, 
participants were again divided into groups. Random group assignment for retrieval groups 
occurred where participants were in either the spiral or the pictures group, or were put in the 
listen as usual group. This latter group acted as a control. 
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We also sought information that indicates whether specific emotional words from the 
narrative (target words, such as, Hostage) were more easily remembered than either neutral or 
emotional words (Non-target words, such as Defy), which did not feature in the story – when 
prompts that may remind people of the target word are given. This is called perceptual priming. 
To test this, we conducted a Word-Stem Task (WST), where participants were required to 
complete word lists. We want to see whether participants will recall words which were in the 
narrative, over other possible words that fit the same beginning, i.e., Mis_____, could be 
Misery or Mister, where the word Misery featured in the story. We also had participants 
complete a Word-Association Task (WAT) where they were given a word, and then asked to 
say the first word that comes into their head, which if priming is operating, will be in the 
narrative (i.e., Sand → Desert, where the word Desert featured in the story). This is called 
conceptual priming. 
We are also interested in the effect of dissociation on sense of self (beliefs about the 
self, and who you are), which we measured with the Sense of Self Scale (SOSS). We also asked 
participants to complete the revised Impact of Events Scale - 6 (IES-6) to control for any post-
traumatic stress symptoms experienced. 
If you feel the need to talk to anyone about the effect this study has had on you, a list of support 
services has been attached at the end of this debriefing form.  If you want further information 





















Samaritans: 0800 726 666 
Lifeline: 0800 543 354 
Health Line: 0800 611 116 
 
Counselling services 
University of Canterbury Counselling service: (03) 364 2402 
Petersgate Counselling Service: (03) 343 3391 
 
Emergency services 



































We are conducting a study that looks at whether, 
and how dissociation (e.g. losing track of time, 
daydreaming) affects an individual’s ability to take 
in and remember emotional information.  
  
Participants would be required to attend two 
short sessions: 
• Listen to a short audio recording of a man being 
captured by terrorists, and answer some 
questions (40mins max.) 
• Three days later come and recall what we did in 
the first session (20mins max.) 
If you wish to take part in our study and are over 
18, please contact Gareth Faulkner at  
Gareth.faulkner@pg.canterbury.ac.nz, or Michelle 
Downs-Woolley at michelle.downs-
woolley@pg.canterbury.ac.nz for details. 
Supervisor:  
Martin Dorahy martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz  
This study has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee (HEC 
2018/12). 
PSYC100-level 




Gareth Faulkner or 
Michelle Downs-





in for Me? 
• $5 Coffee 
Voucher 
AND 
• $10 Westfield 
Voucher 
OR 
• PSYC 105/106 
Course Points 
Participants 
Wanted 
